

*Secrecy 78-1551/18*

DDA 78-1551/18

26 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration  
SUBJECT: "Rusty Blue Bags"

STATINTL

STATINTL

1. You and I may run the risk of incurring [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] wrath as I respond to the question you properly  
put to me in your note of 22 December.

STATINTL

2. Last week, in what I understand to be a forceful  
conversation, [REDACTED] directed Dave Brandwein of OTS to  
undertake immediate procurement of the bags. [REDACTED] further  
directed Brandwein to "do this without any coordination with  
DDA." Inasmuch as Dave was not enjoined to secrecy, he  
informed me of the matter.

3. At my request, Dave's people have had the manu-  
facturer of the bags undertake a study to see if they  
could be made more tamper proof. They also were pursuing  
several other devices that could possibly serve the same  
purpose.

STATINTL

4. It would appear, then, the current status is that  
the bags are under order. On the date of this memorandum,  
I am asking Dave Brandwein to furnish you a separate report.



John F. Blake

Distribution:

Orig - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - [REDACTED]  
1 - D/OTS  
1 - D/Sec  
1 - DDA

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A Rec'd by  
78-1551/7

25X1A Rec'd by  
78-5230/16

22 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Security Containers


I just signed another letter advertising that we have done research on security containers such as the "Rusty blue bags." Where does that project stand? I really think there are some documents I would like to pass around within the Agency and just keep out of the eyes of anyone except principals. While the blue bags would not do against the KGB, I think they will suffice this purpose.

*[Signature]*  
STANSFIELD TUR

25X1A

ORIGINAL COPY 010143  
REF ID: A612122  
22 Dec. 1984  
DRAFTED BY [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Blake



28-1551/16

*[Handwritten signature]*

ILLEGIB

Just to be sure that your research was complete, the clips for the bag (I'm informed) were to be color coded and possibly stamped with a code number or other identification so that they would be individualized and only the individual who inserted the clip would have that particular clip which he would retain under secure control. In other words, barring someone counterfeiting one, that would add some security to the system. Also, the intent is not ~~xxx~~ inviolable packaging, but an extra measure of confidentiality in passing papers among top echelons (similar to the paper you recently sent in a Scotch-taped sealed "Eyes Only" envelope to the DCI-- which can easily be reopened and resealed or a new envelope made to conceal the fact that it has been opened along the way) which would be better than simply a sealed envelope as is now used.

Wanted to mention these two things for your ~~xxxxxx~~ info since they may come up when you make your presentation on a OTS-recommended container.

Date 5 Aug 78

STATINTL

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS  
5-75 EDITIONS

DD/A Registration  
78-155115

1-21-1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration  
FROM: Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security  
SUBJECT: Pouch Protection Evaluation -  
Zippered Plastic Briefcase  
REFERENCE: Memo dtd 21 June 1978 for ADDCI  
from DCI, subject: Security Consciousness

1. Action Requested: This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. Background: As a result of interest indicated by DCI in reference memorandum to utilize the zippered plastic briefcase on a trial basis, this Office undertook to establish the security of the system for the purposes suggested.

During this examination we consulted with the Chemical Branch, Office of Technical Service, for their professional assessment of the system. The zippered plastic briefcases are available on the commercial market and the clips that "secure the bag" are available in large quantities. The Office of Technical Service in their examination of the briefcase indicates that it does not offer any security to a sophisticated entry attempt and only minimal security to casual entry. There are many entry points in this container, the most obvious of which are: (1) Simply reapplying the seal (again they are commercially available); (2) Breaking the seal and gluing it back together (the second break would be at the same point as the first); or (3) Unstitching the top.

It is our professional judgment that the plastic briefcases not be used for the purposes indicated as it would only provide a false sense of security.

OS 8 2031

While reviewing the zippered plastic briefcase with OTS we did become aware that there are secure methods that can be used for the purposes outlined. The costs of these systems are approximately the same as the briefcase we examined but they are not reuseable.

3. Recommendation: Based on our examination of the zippered plastic briefcase with the disposable seal, it is recommended that the Office of Security pursue the examination of the more secure containers with the Office of Technical Service and provide same to the DCI for his perusal.

[REDACTED]

Robert W. Gambino

APPROVED : \_\_\_\_\_

STATINTL

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE : \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

Orig - Return to D/Sec  
2 - DDA

TAB

21 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Security Consciousness

STATINTL

1. I am impressed by [REDACTED] latest memo (attached). It jibes with all kinds of conversations I have had in recent days from middle-level groups to all of the DDO branch chiefs to numerous individual conversations. Almost everyone is hypnotized by the fact that all leaks must come from somewhere else. No one is thinking of how to stop the leaks in his office. I would really like to get geared up on this with a poster campaign, a lecture campaign, a "Security Consciousness Week," or whatever other gimmicks we need.

STATINTL

2. Speaking of [REDACTED] I'm still concerned about a lack of clear identification of classified paper. Would it be impossible to put all classified messages on salmon paper like we do outgoing messages? Would it be possible to buy a stock of white paper for classified letters and memoranda in which the paper had a red diagonal stripe down it?

STATINTL

3. Beyond this, [REDACTED] once showed me a zippered plastic briefcase (attached) with a plastic disposable seal (which he obtained from OTS). I'd like to buy a hundred of these and put them into use on a trial basis. The idea would be that when one of us wanted to send something very sensitive to another he would put it in such a case, label it on the front, "Seal to be broken only by \_\_\_\_\_," put a plastic seal inside the case and then use a second seal to secure it on the outside. When it is delivered to the addressee, he will clearly know whether somebody has opened it improperly en route as he breaks the seal or finds that the seal has already been broken. After he has read it, he takes the seal from inside the case and reseals it and changes the label to send it back to the originator. Please look into this one.

STATINTL

STANSFIELD TURNER

DD/A Registry

78-1551/14

100-1074

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] Assistant to the NIO for Political Economy

FROM: John F. Blake  
STATINTL Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: Memorandum for DDA from A/NIO/PE, dated  
21 June 1978, same subject

STATINTL I. The concern of each employee, coupled with actual personal adherence and self-discipline in becoming acquainted with and following security regulations, is the central strength of our security program. Unless there is commitment on the part of each employee and supervisory command in these areas, the entire program suffers. While I appreciate your "two cheers" for the [REDACTED], I am surprised that you seem to recognize it as a new subject of security and administrative concern. I will therefore add the comment that over a year ago, as a result of some serious deficiencies in these particular areas, much was done to rectify and bolster procedural processes in the classification and marking of graphic materials. As part of these actions, [REDACTED] "Security Markings on Graphic Materials," was published on 27 April 1977. The instant [REDACTED] is a reissue of this first Notice, republished with only minor change after the need to continue to highlight this problem was found to exist in discussions between the Office of Security and the Printing and Photography Division, Office of Logistics (P&PD/OL).

STATINTL

STATINTL

2. The Office of Security has reviewed the matter of classification markings, etc., as presented in paragraph 2 of your memorandum. Those responsible in Graphics and Visual Aids Staff (G&VAS), P&PD/OL, report that they use an internal work order format which requires that the classification of the graphic to be produced be identified and recorded

OS8 1843/A

and, where feasible, they attempt to standardize the placement of the classification and control markings at the top and bottom middle of each visual aid. P&PD/OL will continue to demand customer compliance in affording proper and appropriate classification and control instructions in each new request. As you are aware, these responsibilities must lie with the customer as P&PD/G&VAS personnel are not in a position to be knowledgeable of levels of classification or degree of sensitivity of much of the material they process. Employees who have graphic arts requirements cannot delegate their personal security responsibilities in these cases. Thus, they are expected to be aware of the appropriate security regulations and procedures affecting their work responsibilities.

STATINTL

3. [REDACTED] of the Records Administration Branch/ISAS is presently pursuing the matter of standardizing the size of classification and control markings/stamps to be used on Agency material. An appropriate Headquarters Notice will be issued as soon as these determinations are made. In the interim, you may desire to direct your suggestions and comments to [REDACTED] Chief/ISAS/DDA, regarding these matters.

STATINTL

4. The Office of Security is presently working with command elements within NFAC to develop a specialized briefing (or rebriefing) on those security procedures lacking in the NFAC work environment. Additionally, thought is being given to highlighting selected Headquarters Security Regulations and Notices as required reading by all Agency employees on a semiannual basis. This requirement would not only reinforce the responsibility on supervisory personnel to be aware of those regulations which require special emphasis, but also insure that personnel under their jurisdiction are fully cognizant and responsive to these requirements.

7/1/2001 - RHE

John F. Blake

Distribution:

Orig. - Adse  
12 - DD/A *July*  
1 - D/Sec

DISPATCHED - COMM-FORWARD - DRAFT

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

STATINTL

ORIGINATOR:

[REDACTED]  
Robert W. Gambino  
Director of Security

13 April 1978  
Date

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

TAB

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

78-15517

National Intelligence Officers

21 June 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack Blake  
DDA

STATINTL FROM : [REDACTED]  
A/NIO/PE

STATINTL SUBJECT : [REDACTED]

1. Two cheers for your much needed Notice on "Security Markings on Graphic Materials." Time and again, I have been dismayed by the lack of rigor and sensitivity in the handling and marking of these graphics, especially in the draft stage.

2. Two suggestions: Could you direct that the classification markings appear in one standard place (e.g., in the middle of a page, at the top and bottom)? I find on many graphics you really have to hunt to find the classification. Could you also direct that the marking be made large enough so that you don't have to read it in a magnifying glass? In some graphics I have seen recently, the classification is printed in type that is almost as small as the cartography production number.

STATINTL

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DDIA REGISTRY  
78-155112

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

Executive Registry  
78-5230162

7 JUL 1978

*Security*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: Improving Security Discipline

STATINTL  
REFERENCE: Memo dtd 19 Jun 78 to DCI from [REDACTED]  
STATINTL NIO, subject: Your Note of  
STATINTL 30 May 1978 on my Proposal for Improving  
Document Security

STATINTL 1. Action Requested: It is requested that you sign  
the attached letter.

STATINTL 2. Background: [REDACTED] sent you a memorandum  
in which he suggested that the Office of Security look into  
designing a special "consciousness-raising" program for  
analysts and NIO-types. He expressed the opinion that  
sensitivity in handling classified information would be  
every bit as important to this segment of the Agency popula-  
tion as their being alert to the threat from the KGB.

STATINTL The senior Security Officer assigned to NFAC, Jack  
STATINTL [REDACTED] has contacted [REDACTED] and has elicited his ideas  
STATINTL as a first step in preparing a briefing specially tailored to  
STATINTL analyst needs. [REDACTED] has agreed to have Bob  
STATINTL the senior Security Officer assigned to your  
STATINTL Staff, assist [REDACTED] in putting the briefing together.  
STATINTL Bob, as you may recall, created the very well-received  
STATINTL security awareness briefing presented at the recent Industrial  
STATINTL Security Symposium. It is now available for use by our con-  
STATINTL tractors.

OS 3 1020/4-A

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STATINTL

STATINTL

In line with [REDACTED] suggestion to [REDACTED] the briefing will be in the nature of a questioning, give-and-take session, rather than simply talking to a group. Video tape coverage will enable us to make subsequent presentations to a wider audience, hopefully stimulating additional dialogue and surfacing security problems of which we may be unaware. This coverage will also enable periodic replay as impact is lost with the passage of time.

As to my previous memorandum on this Subject, I regret that it came across to you as being defensive in tone. My reference to the recently completed Security Reindoctrination Program was intended solely to convey to you my feeling, which I still hold, that this presentation has served as a very effective tool in raising the level of security awareness among our employees.

Presented to over [REDACTED] Agency employees since STATINTL May of this year, the Reindoctrination discussed the psychological impact of today's external environment--writings of former employees, Privacy Act, FOIA, media coverage, etc.--and combined it with an internal environment where employees are so frequently exposed to classified material and handle it so often that they become careless and casual. Security issues which everyone saw so clearly and vividly at the time of employment have been lost in unthinking routine.

Reaction to these Reindoctrination presentations (we have given sixty-seven to date) has been exactly along the lines both you and this Office are seeking. For example, following a presentation yesterday, an employee came up to our speaker and said, "You have revitalized me. I had forgotten to pay attention to all these everyday security precautions."

I have covered the Reindoctrination at some length in order to assure you that steps are being taken to maintain and "revitalize" security consciousness inside our buildings. This Office is not, however, trying to make it appear that we have won the battle or done everything we can. At the present time, two suggested Agency notices have been prepared which deal with controlling visitors to Agency buildings and stopping

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unauthorized removal of classified documents from Agency buildings. Other specific areas such as these will continue to be identified and addressed while, at the same time, we will continue to stimulate the overall security consciousness of our employees, taking advantage of the impetus that your interest provides.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to [REDACTED]

STATINTL

Att [REDACTED]

Distribution:  
Orig - Adse  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DD/A

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DD/A Registry  
78-1551/13

Executive Registry  
78-5230/13

12 JUL 1978

STATINTL

Dear [REDACTED]

I appreciated receiving your thoughtful comments concerning the special security problems that a busy analyst must face in the course of his daily work. I passed these comments on to the Office of Security and was pleased to learn that you have already had discussions with security representatives and that plans for a special briefing are being worked up.

Thank you for your initiative, awareness, and continued interest.

Yours,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

[REDACTED]  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Letter to [REDACTED]

STATINTL ORIGINATOR:  
[REDACTED]

7 JUL 1978

Acting Director of Security

Distribution:

Orig - Adse  
1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
① - DD/A  
1 - AD/Security

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Distribution:

Original Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

Received Registry

78-5230/11

STATINTL  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DD/A

3 JUL 1978

Sid -

I agree fully with [REDACTED] not because he said it but because I observe it. We are not security conscious as an agency - less problem with external than [REDACTED] procedures, but not good on either. The defense that you memo others are - new people like your briefing - but because it covered the external threat I suspect.

I'm looking for a major new motivation or security consciousness inside our buildings - [REDACTED]

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DC/A Registry

78-1351/10

29 JUN 1978

Executive Registry  
78-5230/9

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [REDACTED]  
STATINTL Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: Improving Security Discipline

STATINTL REFERENCE: Memo dtd 19 Jun 78 to DCI from [REDACTED]  
STATINTL [REDACTED] NIO, subject: Your Note of  
30 May 1978 on my Proposal for Improving  
Document Security

1. Action Requested: It is requested that you sign  
the attached letter.

2. Background: In his memorandum, [REDACTED] acknowl-  
edges that the root problem in document security involves a  
lack of self-discipline on the part of Agency employees, and  
he suggests that the Office of Security design a special  
"consciousness-raising" program for analysts and NIO types  
in order to promote and reinforce this sense of discipline.

This Office has just completed a Security Reindoc-  
trination Program for all employees in the Headquarters area.  
It was designed for the sole purpose of raising the level of  
security awareness among our employees. While it stressed,  
of course, the external threat, it did not neglect the  
necessity for individual self-discipline in the handling and  
discussion of classified information. In view of the highly  
laudatory comments we have received from the attendees follow-  
ing each briefing, we are both surprised and disappointed that  
at least one listener felt we had missed the mark so far that  
further "consciousness-raising" efforts are needed. If this  
is true, it is regrettable that this opportunity to address  
each employee at Headquarters was not used to maximum  
advantage.

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STATINTL

In an effort to meet the express needs mentioned by [REDACTED] representatives of this Office are already in contact with NFAC. A special briefing tailored to analyst needs will be developed and presented. We plan to video tape the presentation for subsequent use with a wider audience and for periodic replay.

STATINTL

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to [REDACTED]

Att

Distribution:

Orig - Adse  
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DD/A Registry
78-1551/11

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
78-5230/10

STATINTL

Dear [REDACTED]

The Office of Security has read your provocative memorandum suggesting a security "consciousness-raising" program for analysts and has initiated discussions with NFAC administrative officials concerning the development of a special briefing on control of classified data at all levels of sensitivity. Consideration is being given to video taping the briefing for presentation to other components.

I appreciate your continued interest in the security of our classified information.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

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Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

STATINTL

SUBJECT: Letter to [REDACTED]

ORIGINATOR:

29 JUN 1978

Date

(Acting Director of Security)

STATINTL

Distribution:

Orig - Adse  
1 - DCI  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER  
1 - DD/A  
1 - AD/Security

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

Executive Registry  
78-5230/7

23 June 1978

DD/A Registry  
78-1531/8

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : B. C. Evans  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : Attached Memorandum (ER 78-5230/7)

1. The formula sketched in paragraph 3 sends a few chills up my spine because:

"Who sent what to whom? What proof does one have they received it and who besides the conveyor (in this case very senior officers) is to follow up on making sure a response is received and so recorded?"

2. The above vulnerabilities can be overcome if one is sure that a copy is filed in the appropriate registry. If the paper is so sensitive that no copy is to be retained except in the originating office, it would be a must that the Executive Registry here and elsewhere have a blind memorandum specifying date, subject, and control number. It goes without saying that the more sensitive an item is, the greater need for Control/Registry so that one can trace the trail and accountability in the event of loss or determination of a state of play on any given action. I hope you will take the above into account when you review this.

STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
B. C. Evans

BCEvans:sk  
Distribution:  
0 - Addressee  
1 - ES Chrono  
X - ER

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE Security )

~~A~~ INISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6  
This Notice Expires 1 June 1979

STATINTL

SECURITY

13 June 1978

STATINTL

### SECURITY MARKINGS ON GRAPHIC MATERIALS

1. Classified graphic materials require the same classification or control markings as classified documents. Failure to properly classify these materials can result in the dissemination of highly sensitive materials to unauthorized viewers. In the preparation of graphic materials, numerous preliminary sketches or printings may be made before final selection. Without the proper classification or markings on each item, artists or printers not holding appropriate security clearances could be involved in the work or unmarked drafts could be discarded as unclassified trash.

2. Agency graphics and printing facilities will not accept job orders if the materials lack proper classification or control markings. Unclassified items or projects should be so marked. The responsibility for providing such markings rests with the originator.

JOHN F. BLAKE  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES (1-6)

ADMINISTRATIVE - ANGUS 630 691

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Executive Registry  
78-52306

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DD/A Registry  
78-15516

NFAC No. 2501-78  
19 June 1978

JYF

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : [REDACTED] M  
STATINTL Assistant to the National Intelligence Officer  
SUBJECT : Your Note of 30 May 1978 (attached) on my Proposal  
for Political Economy  
for Improving Document Security

1. I was not planning to come back at you on this issue because I found your conclusion compelling; namely, that the root cause of the problems we have been having is lack of self discipline. But something you said at the meeting with the White House fellows started me to thinking again.

2. You said that we did have a problem (by no means an exclusive one) with people who tended to become less and less sensitive about classified information, with the result that the line between what journalists are told and what they should be told tends to blur. Then classified information ends up on page 1. The nub of the problem here (as it is in taking papers home) is also self-discipline about security.

3. But what does the Agency do to promote and reinforce this sense of discipline? In my 3 years at CIA I have had a number of "security education briefings"; just this past week I had my fourth. While these briefings were well done, held my attention, and emphasized the nature of the opposition's threat to us, they were not at all focussed on the issue of discipline in the handling of highly classified papers and sensitivity in discussing classified information. In fact, you are the only official with whom I have talked who has mentioned this particular aspect of security at all. When I entered a production office in 1975, I had to learn proper handling procedures on my own, and only this week did I learn that most NIOs and office directors had no information on the correct procedures for taking classified papers to an inter-agency meeting downtown.

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EX-14 EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE Security

Exempt from general classification controls at E.O. 13526  
classification schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
10 years from date of classification

Administrative - Internal Use Only  
4. This leads me to ask if we ought to see what the Office of Security could do to design a special "consciousness-raising" program for analysts and NIO-types for whom sensitivity in handling classified information is every bit as important as being alert to the threat from KGB.

5. My hat is off to the DDA for their very thorough and professional review of the practicalities of my coloured paper proposal. I was impressed by the time they put into evaluating my suggestion.

21 JUN 1978


I'm still with you,



STATINTL

8L HV 04 8 02 NOF

The Director



ER 78-5230/5  
DD/A Registry  
78-15515

Washington, D.C. 20505

30 May 1978

Dear Allan,

Your suggestion to introduce a colored paper system as a means of improving document security in the Agency is provocative. I am not convinced, however, that the problem surfaced as a result of the briefcase inspections is one of inadvertent mixture of classified and unclassified documents, rather than lack of self-discipline on the part of some.

In an attempt to identify existing colored paper systems for classified information, a number of government offices were checked, all of which stated that they knew of no such system presently being used in the government. One Department did attempt such a system several years ago, but discontinued it due to problems similar to those highlighted in the evaluation attached.

I appreciate your concern for security and share your desire to improve it.

Yours sincerely,

[REDACTED]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

P.S. It was good to see you at [REDACTED]

Attachment:  
Evaluation of Suggestion

[REDACTED]  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - A/NIO/PE
- 1 - NFAC Reg.

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DD/A Registry  
78-1551/4

17 MAY 1978

78-52394

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake STATINTL  
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Improving Document Security

REFERENCE: Memo dtd 11 Apr 78, for DCI from [REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer; Same Subject

1. Action Requested: This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval.

STATINTL

2. Background: [REDACTED] suggests that the DCI consider requiring all classified material to be typed and xeroxed only on colored paper as a means of improving document security in the Agency.

3. Staff Position: Upon receipt of your comments regarding my original recommendation on this subject, a survey was conducted to determine whether colored paper systems for classified information are currently being used in the government and if so, how they are functioning. The following four offices, which it was felt would be the most knowledgeable on this subject, were contacted and all responded negatively:

The Pentagon Records Management Officer;  
The Interagency Classification Review Committee;  
The Declassification Division, National Archives;  
The Security Policy Branch, O/DNI.

The Security Policy Branch, O/DNI said that a trial had been conducted on such a system several years ago but that it had been abandoned due to the technical, logistical, and financial factors involved.

As our own in-house analysis points out, to be effective a color system must be essentially foolproof. If an employee is to depend on colored paper to identify classified information, he or she must be sure that the colored paper will always contain classified information, and that classified information will always be on the colored paper. To maintain color control, colored paper would have to be available and properly used at production and reproduction points.

In some cases this could be done by using interchangeable preloaded paper cartridges on reproduction machines. However, roll-fed copiers and computer printers would have to be dedicated by classification level, and computer output jobs programmed to route print commands to the proper machine. Pre-existing colored paper systems would have to be modified or eliminated, since color is presently used to differentiate information by function rather than by classification. Forms that are selectively classified when filled in would have to be reproduced on the appropriate color when classified. Incoming documents from all sources would have to be controlled to assure that classified information was properly color coded or immediately reproduced on colored paper. Conversely, the same type of control would be required for unclassified information. In addition, whenever documents were declassified, downgraded, or upgraded, they would have to be reproduced on the appropriate color. Where the original copy of reproduced information is required for legal or archival purposes, it would have to be maintained separately.

The colored paper suggestion would require substantial procedural changes, with associated logistical and training costs, and it would not solve the problem of employees intentionally taking home classified information.

STATINTL It is felt that [REDACTED] suggestion, although well intentioned, fails to take into proper consideration the problems associated with implementing and operating a system of this nature in an environment that generates the volume of classified information that is generated by the Agency and the Intelligence Community.

STATINTL 4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to [REDACTED]

7s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake

Attachment

SUBJECT: Improving Document Security

Distribution:

Original - Adse

- 1 - DCI w/letter only
- 1 - DDCI w/letter only
- 1 - ER w/atts
- 1 - DDA Subject w/atts
- 1 - DDA Chrono w/letter only
- 1 - D/Sec w/atts
- 1 - D/L w/atts
- 1 - AI/DDA w/letter only
- 1 - ISAS w/letter only
- 1 - ISAS/RAB (Suggestions) w/att

DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION

INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STAFF

EVALUATION OF SUGGESTION ON IMPROVING DOCUMENT SECURITY

STATINTL

1. [REDACTED] suggests that all classified material be typed or Xeroxed only on colored paper. He notes that in his experience in government, the Agency is unique in its relative lack of attention to distinguishing most classified from unclassified documents. He feels that the extra time in living with systems such as cover sheets, colored paper, and colored borders is worthwhile because they call attention to sensitive material and make it virtually impossible to mix classified and unclassified material in a briefcase.

2. In evaluating this suggestion, we posed four questions:

- a. Would the suggestion accomplish the intended result?
- b. Could the result be accomplished more economically by alternative means?
- c. Would the result be worth the cost involved?
- d. Is there anything special about the Agency that would account for our unique handling of classified material?

3. For this evaluation we postulated that the intended result would satisfy two conditions. First, the probability of inadvertently passing information to persons who do not possess the requisite clearances would be reduced. Second, the probability of inadvertently removing from Agency premises information that should not be removed would be reduced. Both conditions stress inadvertence, in accord with the suggestion's basic thrust.

ACHIEVING INTENDED RESULT

4. To significantly reduce the probability of inadvertently passing or removing information, a color system must be essentially foolproof. If an employee is to depend on a colored paper system, he or she must be confident, and deservedly so, that paper of the established color will always contain sensitive information, and that sensitive information will always be on paper of the established color. If this were not the case, dependence on paper color as an indicator of sensitivity would degrade rather than enhance control.

To ensure consistent color control, colored paper stock would have to be available and properly used at production and reproduction points. In some cases this could be accomplished by using interchangeable preloaded paper cartridges on reproduction machines. However, roll fed copiers and computer output printers would have to be dedicated by sensitivity level, and computer output jobs would have to be programmed to route print commands to the proper machine. Pre-existing colored paper systems would have to be modified or eliminated, since color is presently used to differentiate information functionally rather than by sensitivity. Forms that are selectively classified on the basis of variable data entry would have to be reproduced on the appropriate color stock when classified. Color control also would have to be extended to incoming documents from all sources, not only to assure that sensitive information was received or immediately reproduced on colored paper, but also that non-sensitive information was received or immediately reproduced on plain paper. And whenever documents were declassified, downgraded, or upgraded, they would have to be reproduced on appropriate stock. In all cases where the original copy of reproduced information was required for legal or archival purposes, it would have to be maintained separately. If these procedural changes were instituted and rigorously observed by all employees, the intended result might be achieved.

#### ALTERNATIVES

5. An outline of alternatives is attached. One alternative is extending the use of cover sheets to collateral information. Form 26, Control and Cover Sheet for Top Secret Document, is already used on collateral Top Secret documents other than cables. Its use could be extended to cables, and different cover sheets used with Secret and Confidential information. The latter could be simple forms, since they would not require the detailed record of control and access that is filled in on the Form 26. However, the quantity of sensitive Agency information would require that our records storage capacity be greatly expanded, since every copy of every sensitive document would require a cover sheet. Theoretically, cover sheets for Secret and Confidential information, since they would not reflect control and access information, could be removed before documents were filed, and added when documents were removed from the files. As a practical matter, however, where space is available to make notes, notes will be made--and filed. Also, attaching cover sheets to all sensitive information including drafts and working papers is likely to be less than a universal practice. Were proper discipline observed, however, cover sheets might achieve the intended result.

6. Another alternative, of course, is to continue the present system. Existing procedures specify that documents be assembled so that the top page always reflects the highest classification of any papers below it. If the top page is itself unclassified it is to be marked with the appropriate classification and a legend stating

that it is unclassified when removed from the attachments. If this procedure is followed rigorously, a review of documents before loading a briefcase or passing the documents to a recipient will clearly indicate the sensitivity of the information included in the package, and achieve the intended result.

#### COST EFFECTIVENESS

7. The foregoing review indicates that the colored paper suggestion would require substantial procedural changes, with associated logistical and training costs. The cover sheet alternative would impose less cost, and the status quo alternative would impose no additional cost. All three alternatives clearly depend on self-discipline by individual employees to achieve the intended result. No matter what system is followed, each employee must independently determine the sensitivity of the information in his or her possession or control--and act accordingly when reproducing, furnishing, or carrying the information. Although colored paper or cover sheet systems might help to flag sensitive information, each employee would still have to double check before taking action, since no system is foolproof.

#### UNIQUE AGENCY HANDLING

8. There are two factors that set the Agency apart from most other government operations.

a. All Agency employees, as a condition of employment, are cleared for access to collateral information classified through Top Secret. Therefore, the Agency does not face the typical problem of blanket controls on personnel access to classified information. Of course one must ensure that potential recipients of information have, in addition to proper clearance, the requisite "need-to-know;" but this requirement exists independently of classification level, and a surface indication of classification would not help in determining substantive need.

b. The bulk of Agency information is classified, whether SCI or collateral. As the suggestor points out, SCI material already is controlled with a cover sheet system, so we return again to collateral information. Since there is so much sensitive information routinely being processed throughout the Agency, control is best established through what might be called the "loaded gun" principle--one should always handle Agency information as if it were classified. It should not be treated otherwise until one definitely determines that it is not sensitive.

## SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICES

9. In an attempt to identify existing colored paper systems for classified information, the following offices were checked, all of which informed us that they knew of no such system presently being used in the government.

- The Pentagon Records Management Officer
- The Interagency Classification Review Committee
- The Declassification Division, National Archives
- The Security Policy Branch, O/DNI

The Security Policy Branch told us that a colored paper system for classified messages was tried several years ago and did not work out. The problems that caused the Navy to drop their trial system are among those highlighted in the foregoing evaluation.

## RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the colored paper suggestion and the cover sheet alternative be declined. It is clear that no matter what system of identifying sensitive information is instituted, its effectiveness rests ultimately on employee self-discipline. In view of the clearance level of Agency employees and the quantity of sensitive information we process, the benefit to be expected from instituting additional control systems would not justify the cost of implementing them. It must also be asked whether the suggestion addresses the real problem. Experience in checking briefcases leaving Agency premises indicates that the problem is not inadvertent removal of sensitive information, but rather intentional removal.

Attachment:  
Outline of Alternatives

## OUTLINE OF ALTERNATIVES

STATINTL

In response to [REDACTED] suggestion, outlined below are three alternatives in implementing the suggestion and the various logistical and procedural changes to the present system that would be necessary.

### Alternative #1

Use three different colors of paper for classified material (TS, S, C) and white paper for unclassified material. This would entail:

1. Stocking the colored paper in the supply rooms, printing plant, computer centers, and Xerox rooms.
2. Changing forms using those colors.
3. Changing various cover sheets currently used in the Agency.
4. Controlling the color of incoming documents.

### Comments

1. Maintaining proper stock levels of three different colors of paper could be a problem. The percentage of Agency-originated documents at each of the three classification levels would have to be determined in order to procure and maintain proper stock levels of each color of paper. Also, every time a document is Xeroxed, the operator would be required to change the paper to ensure the document is copied on the proper color of paper, and computer printers and Xerox machines without easily changeable paper would have to be batch limited to a single classification.
2. Approximately 15% of Agency forms are printed on colored paper. The color of these forms serves various functional purposes, i.e., the color may draw the attention of the user of a form to the copy on which he or she should take action, file, etc. Also, forms are usually not classified until information is recorded on them, and then they may not be classified at all. If this suggestion were to be fully implemented, how would one determine what color of paper should be used for a form when it will be classified, if at all, at a later date.
3. The present TS cover sheet (Form 26) could continue to be used, but the normal Routing and Record Sheet (Form 610) and the various codeword cover sheets would have to be reprinted on each of the three different colors of paper in addition to white for unclassified material.

4. Since the Agency receives classified material from other Government agencies, this system would have to be implemented Government-wide in order to be fully effective.

5. The colored paper system would also be disrupted by declassification and by the covering memos of classified material which bear the marking "Unclassified when separated from attachments."

Alternative #2

Use one color of paper for all levels of classification and white paper for unclassified material. This would entail:

1. Stocking the colored paper in the supply rooms, printing plant, computer centers, and Xerox rooms.
2. Changing any unclassified forms using the color chosen for classified material.
3. Changing cover sheets currently used in the Agency.
4. Controlling the color of incoming documents.

Comments

1. There should be less problem maintaining proper stock levels of just one color of paper in addition to white. Copying machine operators would still be required to change paper when copying classified material, and production on batch process machines would still have to be restricted by color.

2. All unclassified forms printed on the color of paper selected for classified documents would have to be changed. As in alternative #1, there would still be the problem of forms being classified only after information is recorded on them.

3. The cover sheets presently used could continue to be used, but in addition Form 610 and codeword cover sheets would have to be printed on the colored paper.

4. Again, this system would have to be adopted Government-wide in order to be fully effective.

5. As in alternative #1, there would be the problem of declassified documents and covering memos of classified material which bear the marking "Unclassified when separated from attachments."

Alternative #3

Use colored cover sheets for classified material. This would entail:

1. Changing present cover sheet forms.
2. Applying a cover sheet to every copy of every classified document.

Comments

1. The Agency presently has cover sheet forms for TS and Codeword material and Form 610 for all other documents. As in alternatives #1 and #2, cover sheets would have to be printed in different colors to indicate TS, S, or C, or in one color for all classifications.

2. Applying cover sheets to every copy of every classified document would impact greatly on the volume of paper maintained in files within the Agency.

DD/A Registry  
78-15511

DD/A Registry  
78-5230/1

2 May 1978

Security

DD/A Registry  
78-15511

11 Apr 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: John F. Blake  
Deputy Director for Administration  
SUBJECT: Improving Document Security  
REFERENCE: Memo dtd. 11 Apr. 78 for DCI from [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] National Intelligence Officer; Same Subj.

STATINTL

STATINTL

1. Action Requested: This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval.

STATINTL

2. Background: [REDACTED] suggests that the DCI consider requiring all classified material to be typed and xeroxed only on colored paper as a means of improving document security in the Agency.

STATINTL

3. Staff Position: [REDACTED] suggestion, although well intentioned, does not take into consideration the technical, logistical and financial aspects which would be necessary to implement such a system in the Agency. While a system such as proposed by [REDACTED] might work well in an embassy or other environment where the volume of classified material is limited, unless this concept could be extended government-wide, its application to the Agency alone would not result in a positive gain.

STATINTL

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to [REDACTED]

STATINTL

John F. Blake

DD/A Registry  
78-5230/3

Attachment

5 MAY 1978

I believe all messages in [REDACTED] Pentagon are on various colors of paper & thus [REDACTED] make [REDACTED] I can't see any cost - write 4 unclass; blue confi pink secret; green TS; magenta colored -

SUBJECT: Improving Document Security

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

- 1 - DCI w/letter only
- 1 - DDCI w/letter only
- 1 - ER w/atts
- 1 - DDA Subject w/atts
- 1 - DDA Chrono w/letter only
- 1 - D/Sec w/atts
- 1 - D/L w/atts
- 1 - AI/DDA w/letter only
- 1 - ISAS w/letter only
- 1 - ISAS/RAB (Suggestions) w/atts

RG/A Neg 1  
78-1551/3

Executive Registry  
78-5230/2

STATINTL

Your suggestion to introduce a colored paper system as a means of improving document security in the Agency is provocative. I am not convinced, however, that the problem surfaced as a result of the briefcase inspections is one of inadvertent mixture of classified and unclassified documents, rather than lack of self-discipline on the part of some.

In this day of voluminous interchange of documents of all classification levels, my reaction to a system for the Agency that would have to be extended throughout the government or at least the Intelligence Community to be effective, is that it would not ensure the desired results and at the same time meet the varying needs of the agencies involved. Additionally, stocking special colored paper and using it properly in our document production and reproduction facilities would not be cost effective. Extending the use of cover sheets to Confidential and Secret documents as well as cables might be a viable alternative; however, I still opt for a more substantive reliance on the individual to insure proper control and management of our intelligence product.

Your continued concern and understanding for the security of Agency documents is most appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment:  
Evaluation of Suggestion

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION  
INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STAFF  
EVALUATION OF SUGGESTION ON IMPROVING DOCUMENT SECURITY

STATINTL

1. [REDACTED] suggests that all classified material be typed or Xeroxed only on colored paper. He notes that in his experience in government, the Agency is unique in its relative lack of attention to distinguishing most classified from unclassified documents. He feels that the extra time in living with systems such as cover sheets, colored paper, and colored borders is worthwhile because they call attention to sensitive material and make it virtually impossible to mix classified and unclassified material in a briefcase.
2. In evaluating this suggestion, we posed four questions:
  - a. Would the suggestion accomplish the intended result?
  - b. Could the result be accomplished more economically by alternative means?
  - c. Would the result be worth the cost involved?
  - d. Is there anything special about the Agency that would account for our unique handling of classified material?
3. For this evaluation we postulated that the intended result would satisfy two conditions. First, the probability of inadvertently passing information to persons who do not possess the requisite clearances would be reduced. Second, the probability of inadvertently removing from Agency premises information that should not be removed would be reduced. Both conditions stress inadvertence, in accord with the suggestion's basic thrust.

ACHIEVING INTENDED RESULT

4. To significantly reduce the probability of inadvertently passing or removing information, a color system must be essentially foolproof. If an employee is to depend on a colored paper system, he or she must be confident, and deservedly so, that paper of the established color will always contain sensitive information, and that sensitive information will always be on paper of the established color. If this were not the case, dependence on paper color as an indicator of sensitivity would degrade rather than enhance control.

To ensure consistent color control, colored paper stock would have to be available and properly used at production and reproduction points. In some cases this could be accomplished by using interchangeable preloaded paper cartridges on reproduction machines. However, roll fed copiers and computer output printers would have to be dedicated by sensitivity level, and computer output jobs would have to be programmed to route print commands to the proper machine. Pre-existing colored paper systems would have to be modified or eliminated, since color is presently used to differentiate information functionally rather than by sensitivity. Forms that are selectively classified on the basis of variable data entry would have to be reproduced on the appropriate color stock when classified. Color control also would have to be extended to incoming documents from all sources, not only to assure that sensitive information was received or immediately reproduced on colored paper, but also that non-sensitive information was received or immediately reproduced on plain paper. And whenever documents were declassified, downgraded, or upgraded, they would have to be reproduced on appropriate stock. In all cases where the original copy of reproduced information was required for legal or archival purposes, it would have to be maintained separately. If these procedural changes were instituted and rigorously observed by all employees, the intended result might be achieved.

#### ALTERNATIVES

5. An outline of alternatives is attached. One alternative is extending the use of cover sheets to collateral information. Form 26, Control and Cover Sheet for Top Secret Document, is already used on collateral Top Secret documents other than cables. Its use could be extended to cables, and different cover sheets used with Secret and Confidential information. The latter could be simple forms, since they would not require the detailed record of control and access that is filled in on the Form 26. However, the quantity of sensitive Agency information would require that our records storage capacity be greatly expanded, since every copy of every sensitive document would require a cover sheet. Theoretically, cover sheets for Secret and Confidential information, since they would not reflect control and access information, could be removed before documents were filed, and added when documents were removed from the files. As a practical matter, however, where space is available to make notes, notes will be made--and filed. Also, attaching cover sheets to all sensitive information including drafts and working papers is likely to be less than a universal practice. Were proper discipline observed, however, cover sheets might achieve the intended result.

6. Another alternative, of course, is to continue the present system. Existing procedures specify that documents be assembled so that the top page always reflects the highest classification of any papers below it. If the top page is itself unclassified it is to be marked with the appropriate classification and a legend stating

that it is unclassified when removed from the attachments. If this procedure is followed rigorously, a review of documents before loading a briefcase or passing the documents to a recipient will clearly indicate the sensitivity of the information included in the package, and achieve the intended result.

#### COST EFFECTIVENESS

7. The foregoing review indicates that the colored paper suggestion would require substantial procedural changes, with associated logistical and training costs. The cover sheet alternative would impose less cost, and the status quo alternative would impose no additional cost. All three alternatives clearly depend on self discipline by individual employees to achieve the intended result. No matter what system is followed, each employee must independently determine the sensitivity of the information in his or her possession or control--and act accordingly when reproducing, furnishing, or carrying the information. Although colored paper or cover sheet systems might help to flag sensitive information, each employee would still have to double check before taking action, since no system is foolproof.

#### UNIQUE AGENCY HANDLING

8. There are two factors that set the Agency apart from most other government operations.

a. All Agency employees, as a condition of employment, are cleared for access to collateral information classified through Top Secret. Therefore, the Agency does not face the typical problem of blanket controls on personnel access to classified information. Of course one must ensure that potential recipients of information have, in addition to proper clearance, the requisite "need-to-know;" but this requirement exists independently of classification level, and a surface indication of classification would not help in determining substantive need.

b. The bulk of Agency information is classified, whether SCI or collateral. As the suggestor points out, SCI material already is controlled with a cover sheet system, so we return again to collateral information. Since there is so much sensitive information routinely being processed throughout the Agency, control is best established through what might be called the "loaded gun" principle--one should always handle Agency information as if it were classified. It should not be treated otherwise until one definitely determines that it is not sensitive.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the colored paper suggestion and the cover sheet alternative be declined. It is clear that no matter what system of identifying sensitive information is instituted, its effectiveness rests ultimately on employee self-discipline. In view of the clearance level of Agency employees and the quantity of sensitive information we process, the benefit to be expected from instituting additional control systems would not justify the cost of implementing them. It must also be asked whether the suggestion addresses the real problem. Experience in checking briefcases leaving Agency premises indicates that the problem is not inadvertent removal of sensitive information, but rather intentional removal.

Attachment:  
Outline of Alternatives

## OUTLINE OF ALTERNATIVES

STATINTL

In response to [REDACTED] suggestion, outlined below are three alternatives in implementing the suggestion and the various logistical and procedural changes to the present system that would be necessary.

### Alternative #1

Use three different colors of paper for classified material (TS, S, C) and white paper for unclassified material. This would entail:

1. Stocking the colored paper in the supply rooms, printing plant, computer centers, and Xerox rooms.
2. Changing forms using those colors.
3. Changing various cover sheets currently used in the Agency.
4. Controlling the color of incoming documents.

### Comments

1. Maintaining proper stock levels of three different colors of paper could be a problem. The percentage of Agency-originated documents at each of the three classification levels would have to be determined in order to procure and maintain proper stock levels of each color of paper. Also, every time a document is Xeroxed, the operator would be required to change the paper to ensure the document is copied on the proper color of paper, and computer printers and Xerox machines without easily changeable paper would have to be batch limited to a single classification.
2. Approximately 15% of Agency forms are printed on colored paper. The color of these forms serves various functional purposes, i.e., the color may draw the attention of the user of a form to the copy on which he or she should take action, file, etc. Also, forms are usually not classified until information is recorded on them, and then they may not be classified at all. If this suggestion were to be fully implemented, how would one determine what color of paper should be used for a form when it will be classified, if at all, at a later date.
3. The present TS cover sheet (Form 26) could continue to be used, but the normal Routing and Record Sheet (Form 610) and the various codeword cover sheets would have to be reprinted on each of the three different colors of paper in addition to white for unclassified material.

4. Since the Agency receives classified material from other Government agencies, this system would have to be implemented Government-wide in order to be fully effective.

5. The colored paper system would also be disrupted by declassification and by the covering memos of classified material which bear the marking "Unclassified when separated from attachments."

Alternative #2

Use one color of paper for all levels of classification and white paper for unclassified material. This would entail:

1. Stocking the colored paper in the supply rooms, printing plant, computer centers, and Xerox rooms.
2. Changing any unclassified forms using the color chosen for classified material.
3. Changing cover sheets currently used in the Agency.
4. Controlling the color of incoming documents.

Comments

1. There should be less problem maintaining proper stock levels of just one color of paper in addition to white. Copying machine operators would still be required to change paper when copying classified material, and production on batch process machines would still have to be restricted by color.

2. All unclassified forms printed on the color of paper selected for classified documents would have to be changed. As in alternative #1, there would still be the problem of forms being classified only after information is recorded on them.

3. The cover sheets presently used could continue to be used, but in addition Form 610 and codeword cover sheets would have to be printed on the colored paper.

4. Again, this system would have to be adopted Government-wide in order to be fully effective.

5. As in alternative #1, there would be the problem of declassified documents and covering memos of classified material which bear the marking "Unclassified when separated from attachments."

Alternative #3

Use colored cover sheets for classified material. This would entail:

1. Changing present cover sheet forms.
2. Applying a cover sheet to every copy of every classified document.

Comments

1. The Agency presently has cover sheet forms for TS and Codeword material and Form 610 for all other documents. As in alternatives #1 and #2, cover sheets would have to be printed in different colors to indicate TS, S, or C, or in one color for all classifications.

2. Applying cover sheets to every copy of every classified document would impact greatly on the volume of paper maintained in files within the Agency.

MA 3 32814, JR MA 3 110311, JR

A-3 74

EB

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 1476-78  
11 April 1978

DD/A Registry  
78-1551

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director  
FROM : [REDACTED]  
STATINTL ASSISTANT NATIONAL Intelligence  
Officer for Political Economy  
SUBJECT : A Suggestion on Improving  
Documents Security

1. Action Required: That you consider requiring all classified material be typed or xeroxed only on coloured paper.

2. Discussion: I was struck by your comments on documents security in the latest "Notes from the Director." Of all the government agencies in which I have worked (DoD, State, and US Embassies abroad), CIA is unique in its relative lack of attention to distinguishing most classified from unclassified documents. I have worked under cover sheet systems (as we now have only for codeword material), coloured paper systems, and plain paper with coloured borders systems. The extra time that had to go into living with these systems always struck me as worthwhile: they called attention to the sensitive nature of the material I was handling and they made it virtually impossible to mix classified and unclassified material in a brief case.

Security

- 2 -

Now, a TS or secret cable is virtually indistinguishable from other sheets of white paper in an in-box. In making the suggestion that you consider going to a coloured paper system, I thought this would be the simplest way to distinguish between classified and unclassified documents and easiest on those who have to do the typing and the xeroxing.



(S. of the "red" word  
in the first line)  
for your  
info. Thanks.  
John [unclear]  
[unclear]

STATINTL

APR 13 1978

ER

UNCLASSIFIED  CONFIDENTIAL  SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
Routing Slip

TO:	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1 SA/DCI		✓		
2 DDA	✓			
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
SUSPENSE			Date	

Remarks:

To B: Subject DCI would  
return your comments  
on attached.

STATINTL

3607 (10-77)

Date

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 2/1/66
TO:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING <i>NID/PE</i>	
REMARKS:		
<i>DET</i>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55  
REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

STATINTL

Approved For  
UNCLASSIFIED

408/02 - CIA-RDP81-00142F  
IDENTIFIED BY [REDACTED] SECRET

1901

## **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

## Routing Slip

TO:

	ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1 DDCI	✓	✓		
2 DNA				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
SUSPENSE			<i>7-16-1978</i>	
			Date	

**SUSPENSE**

Lipman  
Date 1-1-1960

**Data**

**Remarks:**

Remarks: 102: For review & comment

to Del.

Excellent point

www.ebookiran.com

Date

36V 418-7

STATINTL

D/A Registry

File 04M-1

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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## OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EO/DDA	6/22	38
2			
3	A/DDA	22 JUN 1978	WJ
4			
5	DDA		D
6	D/Security		
ACTION/	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

## Remarks:

Could we make [redacted]

[redacted] a Special Assistant  
to Director of Security?

To: [redacted] [initials]

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
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(40)

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions  
1-57

DD/A Registry  
File Security

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
<b>TO</b>	<b>NAME AND ADDRESS</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b>INITIALS</b>
1	<i>Bal-Gaudia</i>		
2	<i>D/Sec 4860 Hgs</i>		
3			
4			
5			
6			
<b>ACTION</b>	<b>DIRECT REPLY</b>	<b>PREPARE REPLY</b>	
<b>APPROVAL</b>	<b>DISPATCH</b>	<b>RECOMMENDATION</b>	
<b>COMMENT</b>	<b>FILE</b>	<b>RETURN</b>	
<b>CONCURRENCE</b>	<b>INFORMATION</b>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>	
<i>ATT: DDA 78-155116</i>			
<b>Remarks:</b>			
<i>Please place me when you receive this</i> 			
<b>FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER</b>			
<b>FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.</b>		<b>DATE</b>	
<i>DDA</i>			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080005-6

## OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EO/DDA	6/22	S
2			
3	A/DDA	22 JUN 1978	h
4			
5	DDA		J
6	D/SAC		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Could we make [redacted]

as Special Assistant

to Director of Security?

STATINTL

STATINTL

ILLEGIB

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions  
1-57

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL  
USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

Pouch Protection Evaluation - Zippered Plastic Briefcase

DD/A Registry

FROM:	John F. Blake Deputy Director for Administration 7D 24 Hqs	DATE		EXTENSION	NO.
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	Director of Central Intelligence 7D 5607 Hqs				Stan:  Herewith the reactions of Security and OTS to the blue plastic bag. I suggest you approve the recommendation and then when Security is through pursuing the new device, I will ask them to give you a demonstration of the ease of penetration of the blue plastic bag.
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

/s/ Jack  
John F. BlakeAtt:  
DDA 78-1551/15Distribution:  
Orig RS - DCI  
I - DDCI  
T - ER  
I - D/Security  
Y - DDA Subj  
I - DDA Chrono  
I - JFB Chrono  
DDA:JFBlake:kmg (1 Aug 78)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.	DATE	STATINTL
				OFFICER'S INITIALS
Robert W. Gambino Director of Security 4E60 Hqs.			14 JUL 1978	STATINTL
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. EO/ DDA 7D18 Hqs.	7/14	S		For your signature.
2.				Re-ponse To [REDACTED]
3. A/DDA	14 JUL 1978	h		[REDACTED] on Sunday
4. DDA	17 JUL 1978	S		markings
5.				
6.				
7.				STATINTL
8.				STATINTL
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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SUBJECT<sub>x</sub> (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

ER 78-5230/9 or 10

DATE

30 JUN 1978

STATINTL

STATINTL

Acting Director of Security

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. ADD/A 7D-24	30 JUN 1978		ly
2.			
3. DDCI	G130		gn
4.			
5. DCI	3 JUL 1978		STdey
6. DDCI			
7. DDA			
8. D/Security			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			(EXEMPT BY 142R000600080005-6) Security
15.			

DD/A Registry  
File SECURITY

STATINTL

See DCI notes  
pls.